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DONNA B. WRIGHT, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Case No. 15163 
vs. ) 
ORVAL WRIGHT, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant and Respondent.) 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 to modify a Divorce Decree, divesting the former 
wife of title to the matrimonial residence and vesting it in 
both parties; requiring the sale of said home and the equal 
division of the equity to the parties hereto; and also 
requiring the former wife to pay an indebtedness secured by 
the home but incurred for the benefit of the former husband's 
separate property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The modification was granted, and motions to re-
open and amend were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the order requiring 
her to make payments on her home and reversal of the judg-
ment declaring respondent to own an interest in her home. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ori_ginal Actl,on 
This case was commenced on July 29, 1965, by the 
filing of a Complaint and Waiver in the Fifth Judicial 
District, with appellant Donna B. Wright as plaintiff. 
Ellis J. Pickett, her husband's attorney, was listed as he: 
counsel. The Complaint sought a divorce and the effectua-
tion by the court of a Property Settlement Agreement. R.1. 
Though the Property Settlement Agreement had been executed 
by the parties contemporaneously with the Complaint, on 
July 28, 1965, it was not filed until September 2, 1965. 
R. 4. The agreement provided that the parties' home "would 
be set aside for Mrs. Wright our children." A mortgage on 
the house, incurred prior to the divorce to finance a 
mountain cabin was to be paid by Mr. Wright "until the 
mortgage indebtedness has been paid in full" (emphasis 
added). This indebtedness amounted to $7, 729.64 when the 
divorce was granted. Mr. Wright kept the mountain cabin 
in question and after the divorce sold the same retaining 
the proceeds of this sale. 
Mrs. Wright was also given an automobile, and 
promised $200 per month child support. She also received 
four lots in a local undeveloped subdivision, with Mr. 
Wright to pay the mortgage on those lots. Hr. Wright rece: 
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all the remaining lots in the subdivision (approximately 
20), all contract receivables on lots previously sold 
and 
All of the property in Sections 10, 11 
and 12 in Township 39 South, Range 11 
West, SLB&M, as described in that mort-
gage dated June 25, 1963, and recorded 
in Book S-44 of Mortgages on pages 107 to 
109 inclusive, File No. 119243 of the 
Records of Washington County, Utah. 
which was approximately 1,100 acres. The Property Settle-
ment Agreement did not provide for disposition of the 
mountain cabin referred to above, another small house, a 
Jeep, a truck, two boats, diamonds, guns, cameras, and 
other personalty which Mr. Wright retained. 
Also, the property settlement did not note, 
and the court was unaware that the parties had exchanged 
numerous deeds to property two days before executing the 
Complaint, Waiver, and Agreement. (There may also have 
been other concealed assets, but Appellant's discovery on 
this issue was denied by the lower court. See Argument 
Denial of Discovery, at 26, infra. 
The matter was heard October 8, 1965 (R.6.) by 
Judge C. Nelson Day, and the divorce was granted. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce were entered October 27, 1965. R.8. 
The property settlement was adopted by the Court and the 
decree stated that Mrs. Wright was "awarded the home in 
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Hur:::-icane ... for herself and cinor children," while Mr. 
\lri;hc was ordered to pay the mortgage debt in full. 
Order to Show Cause 
AtteI'.lpting to find a way to satisfy his obliga-
tions, Hr. Wright filed an Affidavit in the divorce action 
on February 22, 1971, claiming that the home should be 
awarded to himself on the ground that the minor children ho 
reached their majority, that ~!rs. Wright had remarried, ana 
that the house was not then used by Mrs. Wright. R.13. ~ 
Order to Show Cause was issued the 11th day of May, 1971, i 
Judge J. Harlan Burns. R.15. 
Mrs. Wright responded through her attorneys 
Douglas Pike and John W. Palmer, moving to dismiss the Ord:: 
to Sho~., Cause and filing an opposing affidavit. R.16, 17, 
20. She also moved to enforce arrear ages in support paymec: 
R.22. 
A hearing was set for October 12, 1971, (R.31), 
but vacated to allow Mrs. Wright discovery on the relative 
values of property each party mmed. See R.32, 34, 35 and 
36. In the order vacating the hearing date, the judge, 
without hearing any evidence of changed circumstances, 
ordered Mrs. Wright to make the monthly payments of $110.Ui: 
on the unrelated mortgage financing Mr. Wright's mountain 
cabin until a Jo.earing on the r:erits o . red. Froc1 the 
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decree until that date, Mr. Wright had paid $3,778.47 
on the mortgage debt. There remained to be paid the sum 
of $3,951.17. 
Mrs. Wright's discovery as to property values 
was allowed, but its scope was severely limited. 
The judge felt that Mr. Wright's income from 1965 to 1970, 
and property values and relative ownership in 1965 were im-
material, struck several of the interrogatories, allowing 
only those pertaining to Mr. Wright's present property 
ownership and income. T (October 8, 1971) 8:3-23; R.36. 
Both parties submitted memoranda on the relevant 
law. Mrs. Wright alleged that the property settlment 
part of the Decree was not modifiable. R.18. Mr. Wright 
recognized this contention but claimed "that the District 
Court does retain jurisdiction over a ... property settle-
ment agreement ... " and therefore could modify a property 
settlement. R.28. 
Interim Failure to Proceed 
In May, 1973, after over a year's delay since 
the completion of discovery, with no further prosecution 
by Mr. Wright, Mrs. Wright filed a Demand for Non-Jury 
Trial Setting through her new attorney, Robert L. Gardner. 
R.49, ~r. Wright had no desire to proceed because 
Mrs. Wright was making the monthly payments on his debt. 
The date set for the hearing was vacated at the insistance 
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.., 
of Mr. Wright's counsel. R.54, 55. The second date set 
was also vacated at his request. R.56, 58. Finally~ 
October 1, 1973, the matter was heard by Judge A. John 
R . 1 uggeri. 
Hearing of Order to Show Cause 
Mr. Gardner's statement of the record recites th, 
the allegations in support of Mr. Wright's claim to the 
house were very limited. 
There was nothing supporting his position 
except a very limited statement that the 
Plaintiff did not live in the home, the 
minor children were of legal age, and 
the Plaintiff was renting the home. There 
was no contention by the Defendant that he 
claimed an interest in the home from the 
time of the divorce or that he needed the 
house or for financial reasons that he 
needed money. Affidavit of Attorney, p.2. 
The evidence presented was likewise very limited. 
The Defendant took the stand and in substance 
testified that he lived in Hurricane, Utah, 
had remarried, and had children by his 
present wife; that the Plaintiff had 
moved to .Las Vegas, Nevada, and remarried; 
that the two children of these parties were 
now of age and not living with the 
Plaintiff, and that in view of the 
foregoing, the court should award him 
an interest in the home or that the 
home be sold and the proceeds divided. 
Affidavit of Attorney, p.3. 
1The transcript of this hearing is unavailable. See Affr 
davit of Counsel, Appendix to this brief. Appellants pre· 
pared a statement 6f the proceedings and served it on~~ 
counsel pursuant to Rule 75(m), U.R.C.P. Respondent havlil, 
I!lade no obJ. ection, the District Court made no settlement at: 
' . ~~ 
approval. The statement of Mr. Gardner appeai;s in berc 
See Affidavit of Former Attorney of Record, filed Novem 
~], in the Supreme Court. 
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Mr. Garner regarded the evidence presented as 
totally insufficient to support modification of the property 
settlement, and did not believe recovery would be possible. 
Based upon what appeared to be a total lack 
of any competent evidence that would justify 
the redistribution of the title to the home 
and based upon the property settlement agree-
ment that was part of the file, I did not see 
anything that the Plaintiff was required 
to respond to and therefore Plaintiff did 
not testify concerning the divorce, the 
property settlement, nor her present 
circumstances. 
The judge, however, adopted Mr. Wright's contention that 
property settlements were modifiable. 
To the great surprise of both myself 
and my client, the Judge ordered the 
home appraised, sold, and after payment 
of an existing mortgage, the proceeds 
divided equally between the parties. 
Affidavit of Attorney, p.3. 
Mr. Gardner discussed the matter with his 
client immediately after the October 1, 1973 hearing,,and 
discovered (1) that Mr. Pickett who had originally repre-
sented Mrs. Wright was actually Mr. Wright's attorney, (2) 
that deeds had been prepared and exchanged as part of the 
property settlement, (3) that a large amount of property 
was not dealt with in the settlement agreement, (4) that 
her understanding was that the deeds meant she could not 
have the house taken away, and (5) that the mortgage debt 
was not related to the house but to property of Mr. Wright. 
See Affidavit of Attorney, page 3. 
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It was at this time that Mr. Gardner learned 
that on July 29, 1965, the day the divorce decree was 
filed Mr. Wright had delivered to Mrs. Wright a Quit 
Claim Deed to the home and real property at issue in ~G 
lawsuit. R.66. This deed was recorded July 29, 1965. 
On its face the deed conveys the property to "Donna B. 
Wright, wife of Gran tor, as her sole and separate propert 
R.64. This Quit Claim Deed was given in exchange for 
various deeds from Mrs. Wright to Mr. Wright conveying 
the remainder of the parties' realty to Mr. Wright. The1 
deeds were executed, delivered and recorded by Mr. Wright 
prior to the date of the filing of the Complaint for dive 
R.63. 
Motion to Re-Open 
The day following the hearing Mr. Gardner made 
motion to re-open pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., alle1 
the newly discovered deed as new evidence to convince the 
court that modification of a vested record interest wu 
improper. See R.84. On October 15, 1973, he filed an 
affidavit of Mrs. Wright setting forth the execution of 
deeds and her understanding that "it was the intention of 
both the Plaintiff and Defendant at the time of the divor 
that the complete and absolute title to the home was give 
h Pl · ·ff " R 63 A~Ltached was a copy of the de tote ainti ... . . 
-8-
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to the hoDe, and a letter froD Attorney Pickett referring 
to the exchange of deeds. R.64 and 65. Attorney Gardner 
also filed a written motion to re-open on the ground of 
ne•.·1ly discovered evidence. The motion was heard on 
October 17, 1973. R.66, 63. The transcript of this hear-
2 
ing is also unavailable, but a minute entry indicates 
the judge renained convinced that property settlements were 
modifiable and the motion to re-open was denied. R.68, 
77' 78. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Judg~ent were then entered. Judge Ruggeri specifically 
found that the title and disposition of the home were still 
before the Court. R.69. Further, it was found that Mr. Wright 
no longer had a duty of support, and that the use of the home 
by Hrs. Wright and the children had ended'. The Court noted 
the inequity of the previous Order requiring Mrs. \fright to 
I'lake the mortgage payments, but felt it was powerless to 
change that Order. R.70. The Court ordered the home sold 
and the proceeds divided between the parties. R.70. 
Motion for a New Trial 
Hr. Gardner promptly moved for a new trial on the 
ground that there was insufficient evidence of change in cir-
cumstance to warrant a divestiture of title to real property. 
R. 72. The court, several months later in May, 1974, filed a 
memorandum decision setting out grounds for and denying the 
motion to re-open. The court's action was specifically with-
2 
See Affidavit attached hereto in Appendix, page vi 
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out prejudice to other procedures to establish the deed. 1 
Motion to Re-O~E_ Gra!!_!.:=.!_ anj_ De_!.lied_ 
In January, 1975, Judge Ruggeri reversed hims 1, e.1 
and granted the motion to re-open, and agreed to receive 
into evidence testimony and documents touching upon the 
ownership and disposition of the property. R. 85. Mr. 
Gardner promptly filed a Petition to Modify the Order modi 
fying the Decree. R. 86. The Petition recited the evidenc, 
of deeds, discovered after the hearing, and noted the dis· 
parity of the property division in favor of the husband. 
Mr. Wright's counsel responded with an Objection to Petiti. 
to Modify (R. 80.), and the Court sustained the objection, 
again without prejudice. R.107, again reversing itself. 
Motion to Amend Order 
Within a week of the hearing sustaining the 
objection to the Petition to Modify, Mr. Gardner filed a 
Motion for Leave to File a Petition to Amend pursuant to 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. R.92. An accompanying memorandum 
explained the legal basis for the petition. R. 94, 99. 
No action was taken by the court. In late 1976, 
Attorney Gardner withdrew as counsel for Mrs. Wright, and 
early in 1977 counsel for Mr. Wright filed a Notice to 
Appoint Successor Attorney. R.110. 
Present counsel for Mrs. Wright entered his 
appearance, (R. 113) and Judge Burns referred the case to 
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Judge Ballif. Judge Ballif set a hearing for April 4 to 
consider vacating the Order sustaining the objection to the 
Petition to ~fodify, and notified counsel that they should be 
prepared to proceed to trial on April 5. R.111. 
Judge Ballif heard the parties on April 4, 1977, 
and entered an order the following day "making the Order of 
the Court dated July 30, 1975 ... final. .. " R. ll5. He 
expressly noted his reluctance to affect the decision of 
another district judge. A Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed and this appeal was perfected. R.116 et.seq. 
In the course of these proceedings, after the 
Judgraent of Judge Ruggeri executed October 19, 1973 
ordering the mortgage satisfied out of the proceeds from 
the sale of the home (R.73), the last $951.17 of the 
mortgage indebtedness was completely paid off by Mrs. Wright. 
It should be noted that the Motion for New Trial 
dated October 23, 1973, (R.72). and the Motion for Leave to 
File a Petition to .Amend pursuant to Rule 60(b) (R.92) have 
never been disposed of, according to the record. The most 
recent judge to hear this case below ordered that no other 
pleadings be filed except a notice of appeal, and rather 
than be found in contempt, appellant has filed this appeal 
rather than seek resolution of those motions. 
ARGIDIENT 
POINT I. THE DECREE MODIFICATIONS WERE CONTRARY TO LAW 
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The lower court made two modifications of t~ 
divorce decree. First, it ordered Mrs. Wright to make th, 
mortgage payments, covering the house, and second, it 
ordered the house sold, with proceeds to be divided evenli 
between the parties. Prior to these orders, Mr. Wright h2 
made all the mortgage payments and the title to the house 
was vested solely in Mrs. Wright's name, as her separate 
property. R.64. 
Apparently, the court based its actions on Utah 
Code Ann. 30-3-5, feeling that the statute authoriz~~ 
acts. 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children 
property and parties, and the maintenance of 
the parties and children, as may be equitable. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdictiion. 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and maintenance 
of the arties, the custod of the children 
an t e support an maintenance, or t e 
distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights 
of parents, grandparents and other relatives 
shall take into consideration the welfare of 
the child. (emphasis added). 
This statute, in different forms but with simila: 
substance, has been in effect since March 6, 1852, when tr 
Territorial Legislature enacted Utah's first divorce 
statutes. See Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 131, 1P. 4 
(1881) and C.L. 1888 §2606, column note. That enactment 
provided for modification of divorce decrees: 
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[\J] hen it shall appear to the court at a 
future time that it would be for the 
interest of the parties concerned that a 
change s~ould be effected in regard to the 
former disposal of children or distribution 
of property, the court shall have power 
to make such change as will be conductive 
~o the best interests of all parties concerned. 
Whitmore, Id. at 131. 
A related statute provided for modification of 
decrees respecting children, property and maintenance "in 
those respects when circumstances render them expedient." 
Id at 132. Similar statutes have been in effect since the 
territorial provision. See C.L. 1876 §1155; C.L. 1888 
§2606; R.S. 1398 §1212; C.L. 1909 §1212; C.L. 1917 §3000; 
R.S. 1933 §40-3-5; Utah Code Ann (1943) §40-3-5. 
While the present statute clearly allows modification 
of periodic support and maintenance provisions, the award 
of real property and the appurtenant house to Mrs. Wright 
was not such a provision, and therefore was not modifiable. 
Also, Mr. Wright's obligation to pay the mortgage was modi-
fied without hearing any evidence of changed circumstances, 
which is contrary to case law developed under the statute. 
Both modifications were, therefore, contrary to law. 
A. The Ownership of the House, Given in 
Property Settlement, was not Modifiable 
It has been unanimously held by all state courts 
that have considered the question that property settle-
ments in divorce decrees are not modifiable. See 
Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal. 2d 419, 240 P.2d 587 (1952); 
Kuckenberg v. Kuckenberg, 252 Or. 647, 452 P.2d 
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305 (1969); Moore v. Moore, 33 hlyo. 23J, 237 P.235 (1 925) 
This contrasts sharply with the companion rule that 
- pro-
vision for alimony can be Qodified. 24 An. Jcir _ 2d D' ~ 
and Separation §941 (1966)_ 
The reasons for the distinction are sound. As 
stated by a leading cor:u::tentator: 
None of the policy reasons favorina 
modification apply to a division of 
property. It should be final when 
made ... Clark, Domestic Relations § 
14.9 (1968). 
In many of Utah's sister states, statutes make 
property settlements unmodifiable except upon grounds 
allowing modification of any other civil judgr::ent. See 
Appendix, Laws of the Western States on Modification of 
Divorce Decrees. Arizona, Colorado, Montana, ~fovada, and 
Washington are among this group. 
In spite of the clear rule, however, respondent 
successfully argued below that property settlements may 
be modifiable under the Utah statute. He cited Doe v. Doe 
1+8 Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916) for the proposition that 
the District Court retains jurisdiction to modify the deci 
of divorce with respect to the distribution of properey. 
R. 27. The court's statement in that case, however, was 
merely prospective - that its order could be modified in 
the future. The decree in Doe was expressly worded to 
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place the hooe in !=ru~, thus giving third parties notice 
of the other spouse's interest, and clearly reflecting an 
award of mere use of the house, not absolute title. 
Though Doe was clearly distinguishable from this 
situation in which absolute title has been given to the 
wife, (R.64) the lower court adopted Mr. Wright's claim of 
modifiability specifically finding that the title and 
disposition of the home were still before the court. R.69. 
The issue of modifiability of property settlements is 
central to this appeal. As Mr. Wright's counsel has stated 
[I]f, in fact, that property settlemfint 
is unmodifiable ... I would suppose that 
the Supreme Court should decide that and 
tell us if we are wrong. T (April 4, 1977) 
20:19-23. 
Appellant notes that an encyclopedic authority 
cites Utah as the only jurisdiction allowing property 
settlement modifications due to the broad language of our 
statute. 27B C.J.S. Divorce §300(4)a note 62.50 (1959). 
However, the case cited in support of that statement deals 
only with an interest in mountain cabins given to the wife 
in lieu of alimony as a source of income. She did not hold 
title to the property. See Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 
P 2d 1211 (1952). Attorneys for appellant have been unable 
to find any Utah case applying the statute to modify a 
property settlement. 3 
~Cases applying 30-3-5 or its predecessors to modify decrees, 
include: Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 1 P. 465 (1881) 
recognized the use of the statute to terminate a wife's use 
of the matrimonial household upon remarriage. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362 (1915), applied th 
statute to allow alimony modification where the decreer·' 
based upon the agreement of the parties. ~ 
CQ~. C~, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916) held the stat•r 
allu,.,edffiodification to grant alimony where none had been 
granted in the original decree. 
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 1050, 193 P.1093 (1920) found 
petition sufficient to support a modification of al~o~. 
Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P.123 (1923) detennineda 
motion to modify alimony could not affect past due install· 
ments. 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 283, 225 P.81 (1928) reverseL 
decision in favor of a petition seeking reduction of suppo: 
payments and reduction of the amount of installment paymen 
of lump sum alimony. 
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P.457 (1925) dealt 
with a petition to reduce alimony and child support. 
Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1 , 47 P.2d 894 (1935) heLl ~c 
a material and permanent change of circUII1stances was neces: 
to reduce alimony payments. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, &9 Utah 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936) held 
that a modification of alimony could not be had in the 
absence of changed condition. 
Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P. 2d 785 (1943) decide 
the statute allowed the court to delay disposition of 
property in settlement to allow the parties to negotiate. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946) 
considered an application to modify custody and alimony. 
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) aaj~~ 
the management of certain property, the income of which w; 
given in lieu of alimony. 
Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.2d 456 (1969) 
allowed modification of a decree for clarification. 
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) considered the pr 
priety of a scheduled reduction of periodic alimony. 
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Some Utah opinions have approached the question, 
however, or similar questions. In Lyon v. ~Q. 115 
Utah 446, 206 P.2d 148 (1949) Justice Wolfe, in considering 
whether a portion of a decree was dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy as providing for property settlement, or not dis-
chargeable as providing for alimony, treated discharge-
ability and modifiability as separate questions, and 
specifically noted that the court expressed no opinion on 
the modifiability of property settlements. 206 P.2d at 152. 
Two more recent cases Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 
P.2d 35 (1967) and Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 
1974) have applied modification powers to affect the award 
of "use and occupancy" of a house, both cases explicitly 
noting that the titles to the homes remained in joint 
tenancy. 429 P.2d at 36 and 526 P.2d at 1127. 
Some Utah opinions have expressly assumed that 
property settlements are not modifiable. In Callister 
v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 444 (1953) the 
3 Dehin v. Dehin, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) applied the 
modification powers to alimony and support provision. 
Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976) considered 
modification of alimony and support payments. 
Cummings v. Cummings, 562 P.2d 229 (1977) dealt with reduction 
o1 support and alimony. 
-17-
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appellant alleged that the payments modified by the lower 
court were not alimony, but part of a property settlemen'. 
and thus not modifiable. The court treated the objectioo 
substantial, apparently recognizing the nonmodifiability 
rule. 
In Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d58~ 
(1967) this court applied :Nevada law but referred to rek 
Utah authority in Lyon and Callister, supra, for the pro· 
position that a property settlement is not subject to 
modification. 
There is, therefore, no dispositive case indi· 
eating the Utah position on modifiability of property set' 
men ts. No cases allow modifiability, and no cases express: 
reject it. However, the above cases indicate an implicit 
recognition of the non-modifiability rule, the rule in 
every other jurisdiction which has ruled upon the same. 
Persuasive policy considerations compel adherenc 
to the rule of non-modifiability of property settlements. 
Where a judgment, on its face, gives no indication that ti 
property awarded is subject to further control of the cou: 
no such control should be allowed. Unless the award is of 
"use and occupancy" or unless a trust is clearly imposed, 
there should be no allowance of subsequent judicial t~· 
pering with title. 
The judgment should be entitled to full faith 
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and credit in accordance with its terms. The parties should 
be able to freely deal with property which they receive. 
Third parties should be able to rely on the face of the 
decree when dealing with parties to a divorce and their 
property. Particularly in real property, marketability and 
freedom of alienation is important. As a case in the 
domestic relations area has stated, 
[I]t is also the policy of the law, insofar 
as consistent with principles of justice 
and equity, to keep land titles clear and 
to encourage alienability of property rather 
than the contrary. ~oy~2 v. Bo~gs, 10 Utah 
2d 203, 208, 350 P.2 6 (1960 . 
The problems resultant from allowi~g modification 
of lump sum property awards in lieu of alimony would 
seriously burden the security of divorced persons and 
those who deal with them. If property in their hands 
were always subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
courts with the possibility of divestment always present 
complete inability to alienate property, or even use it 
as security, would result. 
Allowing modification would place a cloud on the 
title of all property ever held by a divorced person. In 
order to convey clear title to property a divorced person 
would be required to obtain the signature of the former 
spouse. Conveyances of such property already made would be 
questioned. 
The consequences of the rule followed by the 
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lower court, that property settlements are freely m~G 
fiable, would be unjust as to the divorced parties and 
severely disruptive of third parties' rights. To affil'!! 
ruling of the trial court is to burden our cou t · 
r S With tr. 
duty to endlessly reajudicate rights which should be fixi. 
at the time of divorce, and to cast a cloud over all tit!, 
ever held by parties to divorce. 
B. Ordering Mrs. Wright to Pay the Mortgage Debt 
Was Clearly Contrary to Law -----
At the hearing on the motion for continuance to 
allow discovery, Judge Burns inquired, "Who's making the 
payments on the house at this time?" Finding Mr. Wright" 
making the payments, the Court stated. 
[T)his matter will be continued for 
thirty days during which the plaintiff 
[Hrs. Wright) will make payments on the 
home. T (October 8, 1971) 7:10-11. 
The discovery was not completed within thirty days, howev1 
as Mr. Wright took three months to answer the interroga· 
tories. But Mrs. Wright continued to make the payments o: 
the house because the Order (drafted by counsel for Mr. 
Wright) d~d not incorporate the thirty day limit but 
stated she was to make payments on the mortgage "pending 1 
final determination" of the matter. R.36. 
After having complied with Mrs. Wright's request 
for discovery, Mr. Wright took no further steps 
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to prosecute the case. Having been relieved of support and 
~ortgage obligations, he had no desire to proceed. Finally, 
Mrs. Wright set the matter for trial. Judge Ruggeri heard 
the matter and failed to relieve Mrs. Wright of the obliga-
tion to pay the mortgage. Re found an agreement on the part 
of Mrs. Wright to make the r:i.ortgage payments based upon the 
prior order of the court granting a continuance. R. 70. We 
would call the Court's attention to the order granting con-
tinuance. R.36. There is nothing in this order that even 
implies an agreement on the part of Mrs. Hright. 
Furthermore, reviewing the transcript wherein Judge 
Burns relieved Xr. Wright of his duty to pay his mortgage 
debt it is clear that the decision was reached without 
one scintilla of evidence being taken. T (October 8, 1971) 
1-10. Note the decision of Judge Ruggeri was also reached 
without his taking any evidence on this issue. He instead 
relied upon his predecessor Judge Burns, who likewise did not 
hear any evidence from witnesses, only the arguments of 
counsel. 
While the Utah statute (§30-3-5) gives broad 
modification powers, the statute clearly requires a change 
of circumstance be shown to support a modification. The 
Utah Court has construed this statute as requiring a 
substantial change in the material circu.~stances of the 
parties. Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah 1975). 
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Where there is no material and perma_!:1~nt change of con-
dition, the decree may not be modified. Hamilton v. 
.. 
!:lamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P. 2d 11 (1936), Carson v. Carsor 
--87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935), and cases cited therein. 
This Court has further said that notwithstanding 
the equitable powers of the district courts in divorce 
matters, and the broad discretion they possess, they may c 
"act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture as 
to facts upon which to justify its order." Iverson v. 
Iverson." 526 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1974). If, in the 
absence of evidence of changed condition the court is 
powerless to modify a decree then certainly in the absenc, 
of any evidence a modification is invalid. 
The order requiring Mrs. Wright to make payment1 
on the mortgage, under which she paid $3,951.17 must be 
reversed, since it was not based upon any evidence of 
changed circumstances, but upon Judge Ruggeri' s assumptior. 
that the parties had agreed to it and that it was a con· 
dition of Judge Burn' s Order granting Mrs. Wright a contio. 
to conduct discovery. There is simply no reference at 
all in the record before the Court that Judge Burns re-
quired Mrs. Wright's payments of the mortgage as a conditr 
to his granting the continuance or that both counsels for 
the parties agreed to this modification. Respondent may 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
argue other.vise, but the record shows only that Mrs. 
Wright requested a continuance, not that granting the 
sa=ie was conditioned upon payment of the mortgage pay-
EJents. 
Finally if this Court finds that the District 
Court made the modification a condition to granting a con-
tinuance to conduct discovery, then this Court must still 
reverse that Order based upon the rule of the Iverson case 
set forth above that the court was without power to modify 
absent evidence of changed condition. 
POINT II THE EVIDENCE DID NOT JUSTIFY 
MODIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
Even if this Court accepts Mr. Wright's conten-
tion, adopted by the lower court, that the statute in 
question (Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5) allows modification of 
vested property rights, it is clear that the facts alleged 
and present did not justify modification. 
There is, of course, no case law on the factual 
showing necessary to modify property settlements because 
such modifications are universally prohibited. However, the 
factual showings required to modify alimony may be useful by 
analogy. Such factual considerations include the same 
factors considered by the court in the setting of alimony 
such as the parties' respective age, health, work experience, 
and the duration of the marriage. These factors might be 
relevant at modification of a property settlement as well. 
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However, the additional factors considered in 
modification of alimony are not so persuasive. These 
include changes in the financial circumstances of the 
parties such as permanent changes in the husband's earnin[ 
assets, or obligations, the husband's retirement, a change 
in the wife's earnings or assets, increases in cost of 
living, changes in childrens needs, misconduct or remani; 
See, generally, 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation !!bi 
694 (1966) and Clark Domestic Relations§l4. 9 (1968). Thei 
factors all relate to income and support resources and 
needs. Because property settlements are not for income ar 
support, however, these factors are of limited value. 
Property settlements serve to equitably divide t 
marital property and therefore factors relative to a chan5 
in relative possession and accumulation of assets should 
have been considered in order to justify a reapportionment 
of the property settlement. The same factors relevant to 
the division of property in the beginning should have been 
fully reconsidered if there was to be a modification. 
However, discovery on these matters was denied. by the coui 
There was no way for Mrs. Wright to counter Mr. Wright's 
evidence of non-use with evidence of their relative financ. 
conditions and the lack of change therein because she 
was denied access to all such evidence. The court felt it 
was i=aterial. But it clearly was material, and failure 
to consider such evidence requires a reversal of the modi· 
fication as factually unsubstantiated. 
-24-
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The factors which were considered were clearly 
insufficient. The court's findings state that the basis for 
modification of the decree was that "the use of the house by 
the Plaintiff for the benefit of herself and the union 
children has now been extinguished." R.69. Further, the 
court found the house was no longer needed by them. R.70. 
The court then concluded that there had been a substantial 
change of circumstances. Id. 
The court's decision, on one hand appears to 
treat the question as if Mrs. Wright had been awarded the 
mere use and occupancy of the house, though the face of 
the decree indicates much more than an award of mere ~. 
On the other hand the court recognized that title was in 
Mrs. Wright. R.69. In the judge's view, since Mrs. Wright's 
use of the house had ceased, title should be taken. from 
her and re-apportioned between her and her former husband. 
Appellant requests that the Court review the Divorce 
Decree. R.11. It clearly shows that the only party denomi-
nated as having an interest in the home is Mrs. Wright. 
Furthermore, the assertion that the Decree awards 
Mrs. Wright a mere use and occupancy of the house is abso-
lutely rebutted by the Quit Claim Deed from Orval Wright 
to Donna B. Wright, "wife of grantor, as her sole and separate 
property," conveying the property in question to appellant. 
R.64. This deed on its face indicates that it was recorded 
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the same day that the divorce action between '1 
,. r. and Mr: 
\Jright was filed. Nr. Wright gave this deed to Mrs. Hr: 
in consideration for Hrs. \fright conveying to Mr. Wright 
of the rer:i.aining real property of the parties (with the 
exception of four undeveloped lots). These deeds were, 
g iven before the divorce action ';as filed. R 6'1 R 
· ~ · espo: 
although aware of this evidence, would have the Court ig: 
it to achieve a grossly unjust result. 
The lower court was T"ade aware of the foregoing 
evidence the day following the modification hearing. Th, 
court had the power under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. to allowtt 
introduction of these deeds into evidence. On its face, 
Appellant contends that these documents would have manda: 
a contrary result to that reached by the lower court, but 
the lower court chose to ignore this evidence. 
Even under the lower court's view that property 
settlements are modifiable, the court failed to consider 
relevant evidence .in two aspects. One, evidence of rela· 
tive financial condition of the parties at the time of 
divorce and at the time of the modification hearing. Twc · 
evidence that demonstrated that Hr. Wright had conveyed 
fee simple title to the property in question to Hrs. Hrigi 
The modification is therefore without any evidentiary sup: 
POI:JT III THE DE:HAL OF DISCOVERY CAUSED 
A SUBSTA:JTIAL INJUSTICE 
In pre::iaration for the I'.lodification hearing Mrs. 
-26-
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Wright sought discovery of l-lr. Wright's financial situation 
for the years 1965 through 1971. Mr. Wright objected to the 
proffered interrogatories on the ground that they were 
immaterial. 
We object to the interrogatories, they 
are immaterial. T (October 8, 1971) 
7:5-6. 
And the court accepted the objection as to all of the 
interrogatories relating to past property ownership, value 
and income. T (October 8, 1971) 8:3-23; R.36, 38. 
The ruling striking the interrogatories was 
erroneous on two grounds. First, the trial court considered 
the materiality of the interrogatories to the issues of the 
case, when the proper test is materiality to the subjec~ 
matter of the litigation and probability of leading to 
discoverable matter. Second, the matters labeled immaterial 
were clearly material. 
discovery. 
Rule 26(b)(l), U.R.C.P., specifies the scope of 
(1) Parties may obtain discovery re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved 
in the pending action, whether it relates. 
to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any 
other party, including the existence, des-
cription, nature, custody, condition and 
location of any books, documents, or other 
tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not 
ground for objection that the informa~ion 
sou~ht will be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information sought appears rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
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The obvious purpose of the Rule is to allow a 
party access to information which can help him present hi; 
case. The Rule does not contemplate restriction of disco" 
to adr:'lissible evidence, but permits each party to familar: 
itself ·with information which is of secondary importance, 
discover facts which will enable further investigation. 
Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 
(1967) considered the purpose of the discovery rules a~ 
concluded that anything relevant to the subject matter of 
the lawsuit is discoverable. The court declared that 
anything which would aid in a just, easy, and early deter· 
rnination of the dispute was discoverable. 
The very brief interrogatories submitted by 
appellant related to the description and value of land own1 
by Hr. Wright in 1965 and 1971, the structure of Mr,- Wrighc 
investment corporation and its ownership of land past and 
present, Mr. Wright's income for the years 1962-1970, and 
his interests in otl:').er businesses. The interrogatories are 
reproduced in the footnote. 4 
The trial court felt that the interrogatories 
should be stricken if not material to the issues. His 
4 1. State the legal description and approximate fair 
market value of the land you owned on October 26, 1965. 
2. State the legal description and approximate 
fair market value of the land you own now. 
3. As to Island in the Sky, Inc., state: the office: 
(a) The names and addresses of 
(b) The names and addresses of the direct' 
(c) The names and addresses of the owners 
(d) The number of shares owned by each 
shareholder; 
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application of the materiality of issues test in evaluating 
the second interrogatory appears in the record: 
THE COURT: Do you have an objection to Interroga-
tory Number Two. 
MR. PARK: Yes, your Honor, same objection. It is 
immaterial how much he owns now, also on the same 
basis. 
THE COURT: If he contends and alleges a change 
of circumstances and he is worth several million 
dollars, wouldn't it be material as to change 
of circumstances and whether or not it would 
be equity for him to pay off the home? T (October 
8, 1971) 8:7-15. 
Though the materiality of present financial 
condition was apparent and recognized by the court, the 
court did not recognize the equal materiality of past 
financial condition. But how could chang~, or lack of it, 
be shown without proof of the origina~ as well as the 
presen.!_ conditions? The Court failed to properly apply 
its own "materiality to the issues" test. And further, 
4 (e) 
(f) 
(g) 
The legal description and approximate 
fair market value of the land owned 
by the corporation on October 26, 1965; 
The legal description of th.e land owned 
by the corporation presently; 
Attach copies of the corporate income 
tax return for the years 1964 thtough 
1970. 
4. Attach copies of your income tax returns for the 
years 1962 through 1970. 
5. List your interest in all other partnerships, 
Joint ventures, corporations, or business ventures that 
you owned on October 26, 1965. 
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that test was not the proper one to have been applied 
by the court. 
As stated ~~ the !~ce of. !.b!'C. Rule " [I) t is not 
ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at trial. .. " Rule 26(b)(l), U.R.C.P. 
Rather the test is relevance to subject matter, specific:. 
including 
existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and 
the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
Id! 
Here, the items on which discovery was sought 1, 
essential to rebuttal of Mr. Wright's claim that circum· 
stances had changed. The denial of access to this evidem 
prohibited her investigation at the outset, and was pn~ 
error. 
Denial of discovery, while generally a matter i: 
the sound discretion of the trial court, will be reversed 
where there is an abuse of discretion or where substantia: 
prejudice results. Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483 
F. 2d 3QQ (_5th Cir. 1973) stated that a trial judge's dis· 
covery rulings are not sacrosanct and will be reversed if 
fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the rules. !lotir., 
that "open disclosure of all potentially relevant infor· 
rmation is the keynote of the Federal Discovery Rules" the 
c;>rder of the lower court sustaining objections to certain 
interrogatories was found to be substantial error, and th< 
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judgment after trial was reversed. Id. 
Other courts, in considering claims for reversal 
based on denial of discovery have made their consideration 
apparent. In a diversity personal injury case arising out 
of an automobile accident, the plaintiff's refusal to 
respond to questions at a deposition about conviction of 
felonies, lesser offenses, or driving under the influence, 
the trial judge held that he need not answer. But the 
appellant court reversed the case and remanded for a new 
trial, stating that the error could not be called harmless. 
Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970). 
In Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8~h Cir. 1963) 
the court made it clear that denial of access to information 
to which there is a right of access was an abuse of discre-
tion, and where prejudicial would result in a reversal. 
Other cases reversing judgment where pre-trial discovery had 
been improperly barred include McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 
468 (4th Cir. 1972); Goldman v. Checker Taxi Co., 325 F.2d 
853 (7th Cir. 1963); Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615 
(D.C. Cir. 1958) See also Rickett v. Mayer, 473 S.W. 2d 
446 (Ark 1971). 
Clearly, the denial of discovery below was con-
trary to the law and therefore an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant was effectively denied her right to prepare her 
defense. Reversal of the modification is required, with 
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instructions that proper discovery is to be allowed 
before a re-hearing. 
POI:lT IV DENIAL OF THE POSTJUDGl·rENT MOTIONS 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Subsequent to the modification hearing Mrs. 
Wright's counsel made several motions, including 
(1) a Motion to Re-open, pursuant to Rule 
59(a) U.R.C.P. based upon the discovery of the deed as 
discovered evidence (R.66); 
(2) a Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to 
Rule 59(a)(6) on the ground that there was inadequate 
evidence to show change in circumstances sufficient to 
property vested for eight years away from appellant anc 
such a judgraent was contrary to law (R. 72); 
(3) a Petition to Modify the Order pursuant 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5, reciting the concealment of prop 
unrelated nature of the mortgage; and property settleme 
nature of the home (R.86); and 
(4) a Motion to Amend the Order apparently 
prepared to satisfy the judge's conception of procedura 
propriety (R.92). 
The history of these past judgment motions re1 
the judge's ambivalence. Whenever he denied a motion,! 
denied it "without prejudice to other remedies ... " (R. 7i 
84, 107) with the instruction to submit proper pleadings 
-32-
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to bring the matter before the Court. R.68. Once he 
reversed himself, ordering a re-opening after denying 
it. R.84, 85. Then he denied re-opening again. R.107. 
These facts indicate the judge was concerned with the 
procedural format of Mrs. Wright's motions, but that he 
desired to allow her to present her evidence and establish 
her claims. See R.84. Finally, the matter came before 
Judge Ballif who was understandably reluctant to affect 
actions taken by the previous judges. 
Judge Ruggeri's ambivalence sprang from his 
acceptance of Mr. Wright's claim that the property disposi-
tion or a property settlement was modifiable under Utah 
law. Though Mrs. Wright protested that property settlements 
were not modifiable (R.18), ~1r. Wright claimed they were 
modifiable (R.27) and the court specifically held that 
"the title and disposition of said house property [was] 
still before the Court." R.69. Because the court 
viewed property settlements as modifiable the newly dis-
covered evidence was irrelevant in his view. But since 
the court clearly establishes that the house was part of a 
property settlement, and therefore not a modifiable part 
of the decree, denial of the motion to reopen, amend, and 
have a new trial was clearly an abuse of judicial discretion. 
The motion to reopen on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence and the motion for a new trial on the 
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g:?::ouncls of insu::ficient evidence anr1 a jnC6P1ent contrary, 
clearly should have been granted. The petitions to mo~G 
and amend, pursuant to the statute should have been grant, 
as well. In Harris~~ Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.i 
456 (1969) this Court affirmed a decree modification base: 
upon fraud and concealment of assets by the husband. The 
petitions here alleged such facts, and therefore should h;, 
been heard rather than dismissed. 
In denying all these motions the lower court 
essentially held the proffers insufficient as a matter~ 
law, and refused to hear evidence. Appellant contends 
that the lower court misconceived the law and that it was 
therefore an abuse of discretion to deny the petitions 
and motions. 
POI~T V THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO 
HEAR THE UNRESOLVED MOTIONS 
Among the motions made by Mrs. Wright to 
facilitate reconsideration of the modification order an 
a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), and a 
~fotion for Leave to File a Petition to Amend Court Order. 
R. 72 and 92. These motions have never been resolved by t[, 
lower court. 
Motion for Leave to File Petition 
The order appealed from in this case was entereu 
April 5, 1977. It made a prior order dated July 30, ll~ 
and entered August 5, 1975, final. R.115. That order 
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Immediately after the denial of that February petition, 
in July, Mrs. Wright filed Motion for Leave to File a 
Petition to Amend (R.92), which has never been acted upon 
by the Court. 
Motion for New Trial 
A very early motion for a new trial has also not 
been acted upon. That motion was made pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(6), which allows a new trial on the ground of in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, or 
on the ground that the judgment is against law. No order, 
minute entry, or note regarding this motion has ever been 
entered. 
Appellant did not pursue the resolution of 
these motions in the lower court because the Court ordered 
that "no other pleadings [be] filed ... except a Notice of· 
Appeal." R.115. Appellant feels that lower court resolution 
of these motions, with proper instructions from this 
Court as to the law of modifiability of decrees, is an 
action this Court could consider as an alternative to reversing 
the modification. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the protracted term of this litigation 
respondent has steadfastly argued to the lower court "that 
the District Court retains jurisdiction of the parties to 
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modify the decree of divorce with respect to the distri-
bution of property." R. 27. Counsel for respondent assert 
that the Utah Supreme Court had taken this position and 
furthermore, that the Supreme Court has decided that a 
pro?erty settlement incorporated into a decree is modifia 
upon a showing of change of circumstances. R. 28. Clearly 
respondent's theory of Utah law, that property settlement 
are modifiable, was adopted by the trier of fact. 
The trier of fact specifically found "that the 
title and disposition of said home is still before the 
court." Finding of Fact, R. 69. The judge further found 
"that the use of the home by the Plaintiff for the benefi 
of herself and the minor children has now been extinguish1 
Finding of Fact, R. 69. The court further found a change 1 
circumstances. Finding of Fact, R.70. Counsel for the 
respondent admits that this is the theory upon which the 
trier of fact modified the divorce decree, in effect vesti 
a one-half (1/2) interest in the home in question in Mr. 
Wright. At a post"'judgment hearing before Judge Ballif, 
respondent's coilllsel asserted: 
[I]f, in fact, that property settlement is unmod 
ifiable, or the conveyance prior to the divorce by deed 
can't be changed by a trial judge, I would suppose that th 
Supreme Court should decide and tell us if we are wrong. h 
THE COURT: Is that your theory in that case, t 
it was something that could by changed, dei:endin~ upon Ma 
chan<re in circumstances such as is done with alimony, r. 
Park? ' ·14 
. MR PARK: That's correct, your Honor. T (Apn 
1977) 2Q:l9-28. 
The trier of fact should have been appraised 
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that the Utah Supreme Court had never expressly decided 
the issue of the modifiability of a property settlement 
agreement where absolute title to the property had passed 
to one of the parties. Furthermore, the lower court 
failed to see the distinction between the award of "use 
and occupancy" and the award of title. In the court's 
view all property settlements were modifiable and hence 
"the title and disposition of said house is still before 
the Court". R.69. Because the court viewed the property 
settlement as modifiable the additional evidence that 
Mr. Wright had conveyed the property in question to 
Mrs. Wright as her sole and seuarate property (R.64) was 
immaterial. 
commented: 
Judge Ballif perceived this distinction and 
In any event, I would like to hear froCT 
you and hear your view in what way you 
were able, from either testimony or just 
the manner in which you showed an interest 
on the part of Mr. Wright in this property. 
As I read the stipulation for the entry 
of divorce, ·the only party who was denomi-
nated as hav·ing any interest in the home 
was Donna B. Wright, and there was also a 
phrase "and the children". I do.not see. 
anything anywhere or any.deed which r~tained 
any interest in Orval Wright. T (April 4, 
1977) 4:13-21. 
The only sensible interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. 30-3-5 as it applies to the distribution of property 
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is that it only affects or makes modifiable awards of 
"use and occupancy". For this Court to rule otherwise 
creates severe clouds on the oarketability and alienabili: 
of real property of divorced persons. The SunreTie Court 
of the states of California, Oregon and Wyoming, realizino 
' 
the difficulties that would be caused by a contrary 
rule, have decided that property settlements in divorce 
decrees are not modifiable. Similarly, by way of legis-
lation the states of Arizona, Colorado, 1'1ontana, Nevada 
and Washington have reached the same result. Appellant 
urges the Court to adopt the rule of non-modifiability of 
property settlement agreements as was implied by prior 
Utah Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Scott, ~ 
and Callister, supra. The rule of every other jurisdictio: 
that has decided this issue should be adopted. 
Furthermore, should this Court be inclined to 
find that the Property Settlement Agreement involved herei: 
is of the type that is modifiable, the lower court failed 
to articulate a test to measure the circumstances under 
which modification would be justified. The trial court 
apparently felt that the proper test was one of "change 
or circumstances". R. 70. This was based solely upon the 
fact that the children of the marriage had reached the age 
of maturity and the appellant no longer needed the home. 
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This was essentially the extent of respondent's testimony 
at the modification hearing. See Affidavit of Attorney, 
p. 3. Since property settlements serve to equitably divide 
marital property the same factors relevant to the division 
of property in the beginning should have been fully recon-
sidered if there was to have been a modification. Because 
of the lower court's failure to articulate a test to determine 
when property settlements will be modifiable and to hear 
evidence in relation thereto, the finding that sufficient 
cause exists for a modification in this case should be reversed. 
It should be noted that Mrs. Wright was denied 
discovery of the parties' relative financiai conditions and 
the amount of change therein due to a pre-trial ruling of 
the lower court that all such evidence was immaterial. If 
the Supreme Court holds that property settlements are modi-
fiable and that one of the relevant considerations in deter-
mining if a modification should be granted is whether or not 
there have been changes in the relative financial conditions 
of the parties, then the Supreme Court should reverse the 
lower court to allow the discovery of this evidence and 
give appellant the opportunity to present the fruits of 
her discovery at another modification hearing. 
The appellant filed interrogatories approximately 
four months after the filing of respondent's Order to Show 
Cause in. this matter. The thrust of the interrogatories 
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was to determine Mr. Wright's financial condition in 
the year of the divorce (1965) through th e present (1971) 
The lower court sustained Mr. Wright's objection to 
all of the interrogatories relating to past property, 
ownership, value and income on the grounds of irmnateriali: 
In doing so, the court substantially impaired appellant's 
ability to discover e-vidence essential to rebut Mr. Wright 
claim o~ changed circumstances. Beyond a doubt, the lowe: 
court committed reversible error. 
The questions asked were clearly material. filtl 
out proof of the original as well as the present condition 
how could change or lack of it, be shown. By a ruling of 
immateriality the court made it impossible for appellant 
to ever rebut a change of _circumstances. Furthermore, as 
a matter of law, the court applied an erroneous test to 
determine materiality. The record is clear that the trial 
court considered materiality of the interrogatories as 
it related to the issues of the case _instead of relevancy 
to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Applying this test 
to the interrogatories before the court they were clearly 
proper and should have been answered. Assuming for the 
sake of argument that this Court rules against the appella: 
on each issue as set forth in this Conclusion, this Court 
should still reverse the modification granted herein on tr .. 
grounds that the denial of discovery caused a substantial 
injustice to the appellant, with instructions that proper 
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discovery is to be allowed before a re-hearing. 
After reviewing the record T (October 8, 1971) of 
the hearing at which Mr. Wright's obligation to pay the 
monthly mortgage payments on the home in question (incurred 
to finance property kept by Mr. Wright) was changed to 
an obligation of Mrs. Wright, one can only conclude that 
the result reached by the trier of fact was legally imper-
missible. The transcript of this hearing is devoid of 
any reference to the testimony of any witnesses. No 
evidence was taken by the court. 
The modification of the Divorce Decree switching 
the obligation to pay monthly mortgage payments required a 
showing of a substantial change in material circumstances of 
the parties. As indicated in the body of this brief, the 
Supreme Court of Utah has already ruled that in the absence 
of evidence of change of conditions the Court is powerless 
to modify the decree. Since no evidence was taken by the 
trier of fact before reaching his decision to modify the 
Decree, the modification is invalid. 
Two other grounds for substantiating this modi-
fication by the trial court may be proffered. One, that 
the parties or their counsel agreed to it. Again, if the 
record of this hearing is reviewed no statement will be found 
that even implies an agreement to switch the obligation to 
make monthly mortgage payments. Two, that the trialocourt 
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made it a condition of granting Mrs. Wright a continuance 
conduct discovery. If such were a condition there is 
nothing in the record of this hearing to indicate that 
counsel for Mrs. Wright was aware that it was a condition 
more importantly that he consented to the imposition of ti 
condition. If the lower court sua sponte made modificati! 
a condition to granting a continuance to conduct discover; 
then that court has acted arbitrarily and again violated: 
rules set down by the Utah Supreme Court that a trier of 
fact is without power to modify absent evidence of change 
condition. 
The denial by the lower court of all of the 
postjudgment motions made by appellant, under the circlllil· 
stance, was an abuse of judicial discretion. Innnediately 
after making his decision the trier of fact was made aware 
of the deed whereby Mr. Wright conveyed the property in 
question to Mrs. Wright as her sole and separate property. 
He had a copy of this deed before him. Clearly this deed 
coupled with the motions filed by appellant's counsel 
set forth substantial grounds which if proven mandated 
revers al of the court's modifications. One ground alleged 
was that if title to the home had not been conveyed to 
Mrs. Wright, then extrinsic fraud had been committed upon 
the parties and the court. 
From the record, it is clear that the court 
did not know how to respond to these motions. In one 
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instance the court denied the motion, reversed itself 
granting the motion and allowing the introduction of evi-
dence; and finally overruling itself denying its own order 
to re-open. In each instance where a motion was denied it 
was denied without prejudice and appellant was encouraged to 
file further motions. Furthermore, since there are two 
motions unresolved at the trial court level, appellant has 
the right to the resolution of these motions as well as the 
other motions which the appellant filed. Appellant feels 
that lower court resolution of these motions with proper 
instructions from this Court as to the law of modifiability 
of decrees is an alternative to reversing the decision of 
the lower court. 
Finally, to allow the decision made by the lower 
court in favor of modification to stand creates a gross 
inequity. All of the pleadings in the divorce matter, in-
cluding the Property Settlement Agreement and the deeds used 
to convey the parti.es' property were drafted by Mr. Wright's 
attorney upon terms dictated by Mr. Wright. The agreement 
for property settlement commences: 
Wishing to respect my wife's desire for 
a separation, wishing to do everything 
possible to alleviate her tension, to 
contribute in every way to her peace of 
mind and happiness, I agree as follows 
to the distribution of our property 
rights; (R,. 4.). 
rhe agreement then enumerates what Mr. Wright agrees to give 
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to his wife and is executed by him. An acceptance of 
Mr. Wright's offer of settlement was then executed by 
Mrs. '../right. Prior to the execution of the Property Sett 
ment Agreement, on instruction from Hr. Wright, Mr. Wrio· 
,. 
counsel had prepared deeds to the real property to be 
retained by Mr. Wright which }!rs. Wright was urged to 
execute. These deeds were delivered to Mr. Wright con-
ter:rporaneously with the execution of the Property Settlet 
AgreeI!lent by Mr. Wright. The following day Mr. Wright 
conveyed the property in question to Nrs. Wright as her 1 
and separate property. 
It is self apparent that the Property Settlemen-
Agreement and deeds were given in consideration of each 
party receiving respective interests in real and personal 
property. }!ore than five years later Mr. Wright comes 
to the Court and asks for a larger piece of the matr.imonL 
pie. To allow a redistribution of vested property intere; 
under these circumstances is an extremely inequitable 
result. Appellant would request that the Court consider t 
equities of the parties in reaching its decision. 
For the reasons set forth in this Conclusion, 
Appellant would request reversal of the order requiring ai: 
to make monthly mortgage payments on her home, and since: 
mortgage on the same has been paid in full for an order fr 
this Court requiring respondent to reimburse appellant for 
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the payments made by appellant upon a showing by appellant 
of the amount paid; and reversal of the judgment declaring 
respondent to own an interest in her home. Alternatively, 
appellant requests that the two modifications made by 
the lower court herein be reversed and the matter be remanded 
to the trial court with instructions as to the applicable 
law. Furthermore, appellant requests an award of costs. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March, 
1978. 
FRANK A. ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 3rd day of 
March, 1978, I did mail two copies of the above and fore-
going BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Michael W. Park, attorney 
for respondent, 110 North Main Street, Cedar City, Utah, 
84720, postage prepaid. 
SECRETARY 
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APPENDIX 
-----· 
LAWS OF THE WESTERN STATES ON 
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREES 
Arizona 
Ariz. Rev Stat §25-327(A) 
Except as otherwise provided ... the provisions of 
any decree respecting maintenance 'Jr support may be modified 
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion 
for modification and only upon a showing of changed circum-
stances which are substantial and continuing. The provisions 
as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, 
unless the court finds the existence of conditions that 
justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this 
state. 
California 
Cal. Civ. Code §480l(a)(7) 
Any order for support of the other party may be 
modified or revoked as the court may deem necessary, except 
as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of 
the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to 
modify or revoke. 
Cal. Civ. Code §48ll(a) and (b) 
(a) The provisions of any agreement between the 
parties for child support shall be deemed to be separate and 
severable from all other provisions of such agreement re-
lating to property and support of the wife or husband. All 
orders for child support shall be law-imposed and shall be 
made under the power of the court to make such orders. All 
such orders for child support, even when there has been an 
agreement between the parties on the subject of child support, 
may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion of 
th~ court, except as to any amount that may have accrued 
prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order 
to show cause to modify or revoke. 
(b) The provisions of any agreement for the 
support of either party shall be deemed to be separa~e and 
severable from the provisions of the agreement relating to 
property. All orders for the support of either party based 
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on such agreement shall be deemed law-imposed and shall be 
deemed made under.t~e power of the court to make such 
orders. The provisions of any agreement or order for the 
support o~ either party.shall be subject to subsequent 
modification or revocation by c?urt order, except as to any 
amount that may h~ve accrued prior to the date of filing of 
the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or 
revoke, and e~cept to.the extent that any written agreement, 
or if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement 
entered into in open court between the parties, specifically 
provides to the contrary. 
Colorado 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §14-H-122(1) 
Except as otherwise provided ... the provisions of 
any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified 
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion 
for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances 
so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscion-
able. The provisions as to property disposition may not be 
revoked or modified unless the court finds the existence of 
conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment. 
Idaho 
Idaho Code §32 - 706 
Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the 
husband, including a divorce granted upon the husband's 
complaint, based upon separation without cohabitation for 
five (5) years, the court may compel him to provide for the 
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to make 
such suitable allowance to the wife for her support as the 
court may deem just, having regard to the circumstances of 
t~e parties respectively; and the court may, from time to 
time, modify its orders in these respects. 
Montana 
Montana Rev. Codes Ann §48 -330 (1) 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6) of 
se~tion 48-320,the provisions of any decree respecting 
maintenance or support may be modified by a court only as to 
l~sta~lments accruing subsequent to the motion for modi-
fication and either: 
(a) upon a showing of changed circumstances so 
substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable; 
or 
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(b) upon written consent of the parties. The 
provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or 
modified by a court, except: 
(i) upon written consent of the parties, or 
(ii) if the court finds the existence of 
conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under 
the laws of this state. 
Nevada 
Nevada Rev. Stat. §125.150(5) 
If the court adjudicates the property rights of 
the parties, or an agreement by the ~arties settling their 
property rights has been approved by the court, whether or 
not the court has retained jurisdiction to modify the same, 
such adjudication of property rights, and such agreements 
settling property rights, may nevertheless at any time 
thereafter be modified by the court upon written stipulation 
duly signed and acknowledged by the parties to such action, 
and in accordance with the terms thereof. 
New Mexico 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-7-6(c) 
The court may modify and change any order in 
respect to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance or 
education of the children, whenever circumstances render 
such change proper. The district court shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the guardianship, 
care, custody, maintenance and education of the children, 
and with reference to the property decreed or funds created 
for their maintenance and education, so long as they, or any 
of them remain minors. If any of the property decreed or 
funds created for the maintenance and education of the 
children shall remain on hand and be undisposed of at the 
time the minor children reach the age of majority, the same 
may be disposed of by the court as it may deem just and 
proper. 
Oregon 
Or. Rev. Stat. 107 .135 (1) and (2) 
(1) The court has the power at any time after a 
decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage or of separa-
tion. is granted, upon the motion of either party and af~er 
service of notice on the other party in the manner provided 
by law for service of a summons, to: 
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(a) Set aside, alter or modify so much of 
the decree as may provide for the appointment and duties of 
trustees, for the custody, support and welfare of the minor 
children, or for the support of a party; and 
(b) Make an order, after service of notice 
to the other party, providing for the future custody, support 
and welfare of minor children residing in the state, who, at 
the time the decree was given, were not residents of the 
state, or were unknown to the court or were erroneously 
omitted from the decree. 
(2) The decree is a final judgment as to anv 
installment or payment of money which has accrued up to the 
time either party makes a motion to set aside, alter or 
modify the decree, and the court does not have the power to 
set aside, alter or modify such decree, or any portion 
thereof, which provides for any payment of money, either for 
minor children or the support of a party, which has accrued 
prior to the filing of such motion. 
Washington 
Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §26.08.110 
Such decree as to alimony and the care, custody, 
support and education of children may be modified, altered 
and revised by the court from time to time as circumstances 
may require. Such decree, however, as to the dissolution of 
the marital relation and to the custody, management and 
division of property shall be final and conclusive upon both 
parties subject only to the right to appeal as in civil 
cases, and provided that the trial court shall at all times 
including the pendency of any appeal, have the power to 
grant any and all restraining orders that may be necessary 
to protect the parties and secure justice. 
Wyoming 
Wyo. Stat. §20-66. 
After a decree for alimony or other allowance for 
the wife and children, or either or them, and also after a 
decree for the appointment of trustees to receive and hold 
any property for the use of the wife or children, the court 
may, from time to time, on the petition of either of 
the parties, revise and alter such decree respecting the 
amount of such alimony or allowance, or the payment thereof 
and respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal 
iv 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
FRANK A. ALLEN, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. That affiant is an attorney licensed to 
practice law within the State of Utah and is counsel for 
the Appellant herein. 
2. That affiant filed the Notice of Appeal 
herein and within a reasonable time thereafter contacted 
Byron Ray Christiansen to obtain a transcr~pt of the original 
divorce proceeding heard in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Washington County, State of Utah, on October 8, 1965; 
Ned Greenig to obtain a transcript of the Order to Show Cause 
hearing held in said court, October 1, 1973; John Greenig to 
obtain a transcript of the October 17, 1973 hearing on the 
Motion to Re-open and to obtain a transcript of the July 23, 
1975 hearing on the Motion to Re-open held in the same Court. 
3. That on August 1, 1975 affiant was advised 
by Byron Ray Christiansen that he was unable to locate his 
stenographic notes of the original divorce hearing on October 
8, 1975 and therefore would not be able to produce a transcript 
of said hearing. A copy of said letter is attached hereto 
a,s Schedule A and incorporated herein by reference. 
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4. That affiant made numerous attempts to 
obtain the aforesaid transcripts from Mr. Ned Greenig 
and Mr. John Greenig and was finally advised that said 
reporters had lost their stenographic notes and would 
be unable to produce transcripts of said hearings. 
S. That Mr. Ned Greenig and Mr. John Greenig 
advised affiant that they would produce an Affidavit to 
the effect that said notes could not be located but to 
date saici reporters have failed to provide affiant with 
an Affidavit. 
6. That the failure of the aforesaid reporters 
to provide transcripts has considerably delayed the filing 
of Appellant's brief herein. 
DATED this J. "''Y . day of March, 1978. 
~a.JO{OL FMNKA-:-ALLEN ________ _ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this -; 1~'CL 
day of March, 1978. 
,--~ 
\,:cc~ .. Y' · -1 ~ii -<1 .(I,·-.); < ,I 
(NOTARYPUBLIC 
Residing at St. George, Utah 
My commission expires: 
"'"; 
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August 1, 1977 
Frank A. Allen 
Attorney at Law 
148 East Tabernacle 
st. George, Utah 84770 
Dear Mr. Allen: 
SCHEDULE "A" 
Re: Donna B. Wright vs. 
Orval Wright 
Civil No. 3456 
Pursuant to your designation of record on appeal in the 
above-captioned matter you designated a copy of transcript 
of the original divorce hearing on October 8,,1965. 
I have searched the Washington County Archives where my 
stenographic notes are stored, and I am unable to locate 
designated stenograph notes and therefore will be unable 
to produce a transcript of said October 8, 1965 hearing. 
I was able to locate my stenographic notes of October 8, 
1971 and November 16, 1973, and transcripts of these dates 
have been filed with the Washington County Clerk. 
I am very sorry for this inconvenience and if you have any 
suggestions please so contact me. 
cc: Washington County Clerk 
Michael W. Park, Esq. 
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